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[1665] 
Notes 
Return to “Reasonable” in Section 1983 Police 
Pursuit Excessive Force Litigation 
Benjamin Buchwalter* 
Scott v. Harris set the standard that a police officer’s use of deadly force to terminate a 
high-speed chase is presumptively reasonable, even if it is likely to kill or seriously 
injure the suspect. The implications of this are troubling: twenty-eight percent of people 
killed in police pursuits each year are innocent bystanders, and vehicle accidents are the 
most common cause of police deaths. Scott was wrongly decided because it departed 
from the case-by-case reasonableness standard upon which the Supreme Court 
previously relied for excessive force cases, failed to consider the potential risk that these 
chases added to the public, and did not contemplate safe alternative means of punishing 
suspects. 
 
Despite the dangers of Scott’s presumptive reasonableness standard, reversal is not 
likely. This was emphasized by the Supreme Court’s 2014 Plumhoff v. Rickard decision, 
in which the Court reaffirmed—by a nine-to-zero margin—that use of deadly force to 
terminate a high-speed chase is presumptively reasonable. Accordingly, this Note 
argues that federal courts should consider state and local excessive force guidelines to 
determine what is “reasonable” and what violates “clearly established law.” This Note 
also presents guideline excessive force policies that are tailored to urban and rural 
areas. These policies take into account the danger that police chases add to the public 
and set forth means that are available to apprehend suspects safely at a later time, while 
understanding the duty of police officers to ensure that potentially violent criminals are 
apprehended quickly. 
 
 * J.D., University of California, Hastings College of the Law; B.A., Haverford College. Thank 
you to Professor Aaron Rappaport for his mentorship during the process of writing this Note. Thanks 
also to Katelyn Keegan, Emily Goldberg Knox, Nicole Teixeira, Elliot Hosman, and Andrew Ohlert 
for their insightful contributions. I would like to acknowledge the entire staff of the Hastings Law 
Journal, particularly the executive board and Executive Production Editor Margot Stevens, for their 
outstanding work on this Volume. I am eternally grateful for the support of my parents Lisa and 
Charlie Buchwalter. This Note is dedicated to Deirdre. 
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Introduction 
On December 14, 2013, a shooting suspect fled from police officers 
and slammed into Stacy Garcia Gray’s car, killing the mother of three.1 
Two days later, Edward Gaerlan was severely injured when another 
suspect—also attempting to flee from the police—struck his Jeep, causing 
it to flip over.2 This pursuit began when officers received a report that the 
suspect had a knife in a Target store.3 A bystander who witnessed the 
incident highlighted the avoidable nature of this accident: “I don’t think 
necessarily if somebody has a knife that that has to be a high-speed chase 
where you’re putting lots and lots of lives in danger.”4 These incidents 
rounded out a set of four high-speed police chases near Los Angeles that 
killed five people and hospitalized a half dozen more in only four days.5 
High-speed police chases create a significant danger for innocent 
bystanders, whether they occur in cities, towns, or rural areas. In their 
portrayal of police pursuits, films, television shows, and television news 
programs often assume that this risk is necessary for the police to catch 
and apprehend dangerous criminals. However, such pursuits have 
 
 1. Elex Michaelson, Police Chase Policies Questioned After Four Deaths, KABC Los Angeles 
(Dec. 16, 2013, 12:00 AM), http://abclocal.go.com/kabc/story?section=news/local/los_angeles&id=9362857. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
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dangerous consequences: twenty-eight percent of those killed in high-
speed police chases in 2007 were innocent civilians,6 and vehicle 
accidents are the most common cause of police deaths, accounting for 
forty percent between 1987 and 2006.7 The deaths of these officers and 
innocent bystanders should be prevented at all reasonable costs. 
These unnecessary deaths raise a question central to the Supreme 
Court’s nearly three-decade struggle with deadly force litigation: When, 
in the interest of public safety, are police officers better off temporarily 
letting a suspect go in order to avoid unnecessarily risking the lives of 
innocent bystanders, police officers, and the suspects themselves? The 
Supreme Court addressed this question when it reviewed the use of 
deadly force to terminate high-speed car chases in Scott v. Harris.8 
Scott involved a police pursuit that began when an officer clocked 
Harris driving seventy-three miles per hour in a fifty-five miles per hour 
zone.9 After Harris initiated a high-speed pursuit, Officer Scott used a 
ramming technique to terminate the pursuit by pushing Harris’ car off the 
road, but the car flipped over and caused injuries that left Harris 
paralyzed.10 In a departure from precedent,11 the Supreme Court held that 
Officer Scott’s use of deadly force was presumptively reasonable because 
no reasonable jury could find that the chase lacked the inherent danger to 
justify such force.12 To make this determination, the Court focused on the 
relative culpability of each party in beginning the pursuit, and barely 
considered the danger that the pursuit itself could have added to the 
public.13 
In a lively dissent, Justice Stevens noted that the officer’s decision to 
pursue Harris may have increased the danger to the public, and that the 
public might have been better served if the police had temporarily 
suspended the pursuit and apprehended Harris later.14 Justice Stevens’ 
concerns did not persuade the eight-to-one Court, and in its 2014 Plumhoff 
v. Rickard decision, the Court reaffirmed that use of deadly force to 
 
 6. Fatalities in Motor Vehicle Traffic Crashes Involving Police in Pursuit, NCSA 
Information Services Team 51–52 (2008), available at http://www.pursuitsafety.org/images/ 
PURSUIT_A%201982-2007.PDF [hereinafter Crashes Involving Police in Pursuit]. 
 7. See Cynthia Lum & George Fachner, Police Pursuits in an Age of Innovation and 
Reform, International Association of Chiefs of Police 7 (2008) (“By far, vehicle-related incidents 
are the most likely cause of on-duty police deaths, the largest proportion of which are accidents.”). 
 8. 550 U.S. 372 (2007). 
 9. Id. at 374. 
 10. Id. at 375. 
 11. See infra Part I.A. 
 12. Scott, 550 U.S. at 384, 386. 
 13. Id. at 384. 
 14. Id. at 393 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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terminate a high-speed chase is presumptively reasonable, almost 
regardless of the facts of the individual case.15 
Scott has become a casebook example of the Court’s standard for 
summary judgment and interlocutory review. It is perhaps more 
significant, however, because it changed the rules for police officer liability 
for use of excessive force following high-speed chases in litigation brought 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 enables individuals to sue state actors 
in state or federal court for violations of federal constitutional rights.16 The 
Supreme Court has held that unreasonable use of deadly force constitutes 
an “unmatched” violation of the Fourth Amendment prohibition on 
unreasonable searches and seizures.17 Until Scott, use of deadly force was 
only permitted in limited circumstances determined on a case-by-case 
basis.18 Scott moved the goal posts for review of deadly force used 
against a particular class of suspects—those who attempt to flee police 
detection, even in cases where the underlying offense is a minor or 
nonviolent traffic infraction.19  
This departure from the Court’s prior case-by-case analysis20 exposes 
innocent bystanders to the dangers of police chases and has created a 
dangerous precedent for trial courts.21 Though the full scope of Scott’s 
influence on local police departments has not yet become apparent, local 
police departments can develop more restrictive policies, especially 
considering that “local community concerns can trump court rulings, a 
phenomenon which does not always characterize the relationship between 
court rulings and police practices.”22 
 
 15. Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012, 2021 n.3 (2014) (“In Scott, however, we declined to ‘lay 
down a rule requiring the police to allow suspects to get away whenever they drive so recklessly that 
they put other people’s lives in danger,’ concluding that the Constitution ‘assuredly does not impose 
this invitation to impunity-earned-by-recklessness.’”). The Court also held that even if their conduct 
was not reasonable, the officers would “still be entitled to summary judgment based on qualified 
immunity.” Id. at 2023. A complete discussion of qualified immunity is outside the scope of this Note. 
For an in depth discussion of Scott’s impact on the Court’s qualified immunity jurisprudence, see 
generally Mark R. Brown, The Rise and Fall of Qualified Immunity: From Hope to Harris, 9 Nev. L.J. 
185 (2008); see also George v. Morris, 736 F.3d 829, 835–36 (9th Cir. 2013); id. at 849–50 (Trott, J., 
concurring in small part and disagreeing in large part). 
 16. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2011) (“Every person who under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, 
custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United 
States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and 
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law.”). 
 17. See Garner v. Tennessee, 471 U.S. 1, 9 (1985); see also U.S. Const. amend. IV.  
 18. Specifically, when the use of force is “necessary to prevent the escape and the officer has 
probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a significant threat of death or serious physical 
injury.” Garner, 471 U.S. at 12–13; see infra notes 29–35 and accompanying text. 
 19. Scott, 550 U.S at 382 n.9 (“[Harris] committed only a minor traffic offense and, as far as the 
police were aware, has no prior criminal record.”). 
 20. Id. at 396 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 21. See infra Part II.C. 
 22. Lum & Fachner, supra note 7, at 6.  
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Even before Scott, individuals attempting to sue state officers under 
§ 1983 faced the challenging burden of proving that the officer’s actions 
were unreasonable and violated a “clearly established” constitutional 
principle at the time of the incident.23 Scott’s presumption of 
reasonableness makes this burden more difficult to satisfy. It is now 
nearly impossible for a plaintiff injured by an officer’s use of force to 
terminate a pursuit to establish that the officer’s conduct was 
unreasonable—let alone that it violated a “clearly established” 
constitutional principle. A better rule would consider whether an 
officer’s conduct violated clearly established state or local guidelines to 
determine whether an officer’s conduct was, in fact, reasonable. Such a 
rule would empower state and local governments to protect the safety of 
their citizens and police officers from the dangers of unreasonable police 
chases by enacting policies and legislation to clarify when the use of 
excessive force to terminate a police pursuit would be considered 
reasonable.24 
This Note analyzes Scott’s problematic holding and suggests a 
statutory guide for local governments to restrict the nearly boundless 
scope of police authority to use deadly force to terminate high-speed 
pursuits. Part I discusses leading excessive force case law prior to Scott and 
the Supreme Court’s departure from this precedent. Part II discusses three 
problems that undermine Scott’s reasonableness analysis, including its 
troubling impact on lower courts. Part III encourages local governments 
to adopt statutes that clearly define when an officer’s conduct is not 
reasonable, and suggests unique guidelines for urban and rural areas. 
I.  SCOTT Created a Per Se Rule That Ignores Court Precedent 
Prior to Scott, the Court considered a number of important factors 
to determine whether an officer’s use of force to stop a fleeing suspect 
was reasonable. In the landmark case Tennessee v. Garner, for example, 
the Court held that an officer’s use of deadly force to stop a fleeing 
suspect was unreasonable because the suspect was unarmed and posed 
no lasting threat to the public.25 The Court applied the Garner analysis 
for more than twenty years, always interpreting it to require a case-by-
case reasonableness determination.26 Scott departed from this precedent 
and adopted a per se rule that the use of a ramming technique to 
terminate a police pursuit is always reasonable, almost regardless of the 
 
 23. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 547 U.S. 800, 817 (1982); see 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2011).  
 24. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
 25. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 3, 21 (1985). 
 26. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989) (“[Garner’s] proper application requires 
careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case . . . .”). 
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facts of the particular chase.27 When the Court reviewed the video of 
Scott’s chase, it applied this per se rule rather than the Garner case-by-
case reasonableness test that the district and appellate courts had 
previously applied.28 This Part argues that the Court should not have 
adopted this presumption. 
A. SCOTT Abandoned the Court’s Case-by-Case Precedence 
Scott’s holding was a dramatic departure from two prior cases that 
together set a clear and workable standard for deadly force litigation. 
The facts of Garner and Graham v. Connor are distinct from the facts in 
Scott because neither involved a high-speed police pursuit. However, 
both cases relied on an analysis of the facts of a particular case to guide 
the ultimate determination of whether the officer’s conduct was 
reasonable; this case-by-case analysis can and should be applied to any 
deadly force case. 
Garner involved an unarmed suspect who was shot and killed by an 
officer while the suspect fled the scene.29 The Court held that the officer 
acted unreasonably because deadly force can only be used if it is 
“necessary to prevent the escape and the officer has probable cause to 
believe that the suspect poses a significant threat of death or serious 
physical injury.”30 The Court determined that the officer’s use of deadly 
force was not reasonable because, even if the act was necessary to 
prevent escape, the unarmed suspect did not pose significant threat.31 
The Court reasoned that use of deadly force constitutes a seizure subject 
to the Fourth Amendment and that the nature of the intrusion should be 
balanced against the governmental interests based on the totality of the 
circumstances.32 Although the State has a significant interest in 
apprehending fleeing suspects, this alone does not justify use of deadly 
force because “[t]he intrusiveness of a seizure by means of deadly force is 
unmatched.”33 By weighing the officer’s conduct against the specific 
suspect’s conduct, Garner established a case-by-case analysis for deadly 
 
 27. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 386 (2007) (“A police officer’s attempt to terminate a dangerous 
high-speed chase that threatens the lives of innocent bystanders does not violate the Fourth 
Amendment, even when it places the fleeing motorist at risk of serious injury or death.”). 
 28. See Harris v. Coweta Cnty., Ga., 433 F.3d 807, 815–16 (11th Cir. 2005). 
 29. Garner, 471 U.S. at 3–4. 
 30. Id. at 3. 
 31. Id. at 11 (“A police officer may not seize an unarmed, nondangerous suspect by shooting him dead.”). 
 32. Id. at 7–9. 
 33. Id. at 9. 
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force litigation34 and set a high bar to justify the use of deadly force 
because “unmatched” intrusion “should trigger special consideration.”35 
The next significant excessive force case, Graham v. Connor, 
involved a § 1983 claim against an officer who refused to allow a suspect 
detained on the side of the road to treat his diabetic reaction.36 The 
Court held that an officer’s alleged use of force is properly analyzed 
under the Fourth Amendment “objective reasonableness” standard.37 
The Court clarified that this reasonableness test “requires careful 
attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case, including 
the severity of the crime at issue . . . and whether [the suspect] is actively 
resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.”38 In so holding, 
Graham reaffirmed Garner and solidified the standard for deadly force, 
upon which courts relied until Scott. 
Neither Garner nor Graham contemplated a per se rule justifying 
the use of deadly force against suspects that disregarded the specific facts 
at issue. If Scott had relied on Garner and Graham, the Court could have 
properly found that Officer Scott’s conduct was unreasonable.39 As in 
Garner, the deadly force in Scott was an unmatched intrusion, the police 
pursuit was not necessary to prevent escape,40 and the chase could have 
added danger to the public.41 Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia 
refused to consider the Garner factors, however, and re-framed the 
precedent by noting that “Garner did not establish a magical on/off 
switch that triggers rigid preconditions whenever an officer’s actions 
constitute ‘deadly force.’ Garner was simply an application of the Fourth 
Amendment’s ‘reasonableness’ test to the use of a particular type of 
force in a particular situation.”42 Put differently, Justice Scalia essentially 
 
 34. Id. at 8 (“To determine the constitutionality of a seizure ‘[w]e must balance the nature and quality 
of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the importance of the governmental 
interests alleged to justify the intrusion.’”) (quoting United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983)). 
 35. Karen M. Blum, Scott v. Harris: Death Knell for Deadly Force Policies and Garner Jury 
Instructions?, 58 Syracuse L. Rev. 45, 57 (2007). 
 36. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 389 (1989). As a result of not treating the diabetic reaction, 
Graham passed out and suffered a broken foot, cuts on his wrists, a bruised forehead, and an injured 
right shoulder. Id. at 390. 
 37. Id. at 388. 
 38. Id. at 396. 
 39. Prior to Scott, many observers thought that Garner “provided a reliable backdrop against 
which to evaluate such police pursuit tactics as ramming . . . [but] the contours of reasonableness 
changed significantly after the decision in Scott.” Geoffrey P. Alpert & William C. Smith, Police 
Pursuits After Scott v. Harris: Far from Ideal?, Ideas in Am. Policing (Police Foundation, D.C.), June 
2008, at 4, available at http://www.policefoundation.org/sites/g/files/g798246/f/Alpert%20(2008)%20-
%20Police%20Pursuits.pdf. 
 40. See infra Part II.B. 
 41. See infra Part II.A. 
 42. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 382 (2007) (citation omitted). This holding applies regardless of 
the severity of the underlying crime and whether the pursuit or use of force could add danger to the 
public. Id. at 386. (“A police officer’s attempt to terminate a dangerous high-speed chase that 
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isolated police pursuits from other excessive force cases and applied a 
brand new—much broader—Fourth Amendment standard that presumes 
reasonableness. Though Garner and Graham remain good law, Scott 
essentially rendered their holdings moot when applied to vehicle 
pursuits.43 
Of course, the Court can apply unique standards for distinct 
situations. In United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, to pick one 
example, the Court held that “the Fourth Amendment’s balance of 
reasonableness is qualitatively different at the international border than 
in the interior,”44 and thereby modified Fourth Amendment rights in 
these specific situations. Scott’s per se rule was wrongly decided, 
however, because it pulls Fourth Amendment protections out of the 
reach of an entire class of suspects,45 but does not satisfy any particular 
government interests. In situations occurring along the U.S. border, as in 
Montoya de Hernandez, the government arguably has an interest in 
reducing Fourth Amendment protections.46 Any supposed government 
interest contemplated by Scott’s standard is not being accomplished, 
however, because police pursuits often add danger to the public, and 
officers can use other means to catch and apprehend criminals.47 
Applying this per se rule to the facts of Scott, Justice Scalia focused 
primarily on the threat to the public that Officer Scott sought to 
eliminate.48 But instead of adopting a Garner-esque case-specific analysis, 
Justice Scalia concluded flatly that a police officer’s “attempt to terminate 
a dangerous high-speed car chase that threatens the lives of innocent 
bystanders does not violate the Fourth Amendment, even when it places 
the fleeing motorist at risk of serious injury or death.”49 Despite 
purporting to consider the danger to public safety, Justice Scalia did not 
contemplate the risk to the public added by the officer’s decision to pursue 
 
threatens the lives of innocent bystanders does not violate the Fourth Amendment, even when it 
places the fleeing motorist at risk of serious injury or death.”). 
 43. Rachel A. Harmon, When is Police Violence Justified?, 102 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1119, 1136–37 
(2008) (“[T]he Court not only emasculated Garner, but in the same paragraph—without comment or 
analysis—implicitly dismissed the factors articulated in Graham as central to analyzing reasonableness. 
In doing so, the Court reduced the Fourth Amendment regulation of reasonable force to its vaguest 
form . . . .”); Blum, supra note 35, at 59 (“This reconstruction of Garner so as to diminish its general 
applicability will prove detrimental to law enforcement agencies and to the communities they serve, 
including many innocent bystanders who have no culpability at all.”). 
 44. 473 U.S. 531, 538 (1985).  
 45. In addition, there is a significant risk that Scott’s standard will be applied to other types of 
excessive force rather than just to police pursuits, given that there is a dearth of Supreme Court 
guidance on excessive force more generally. See Harmon, supra note 43, at 1119–20, 1127. 
 46. Due to the interest in preventing smuggling and terrorism, “the Fourth Amendment balance 
between the interests of the Government and the privacy right of the individual are also struck much 
more favorably to the Government at the border.” Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 540. 
 47. See infra Part II.A. 
 48. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 383 (2007).  
 49. Id. at 386. For a detailed description of such available tactics, see infra Part II.B. 
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the chase, as would typically be required under a Garner analysis.50 In fact, 
the suspect could likely have been safely apprehended later using widely 
available police tactics, such as GPS tracking. Though perhaps slightly 
overstated, this rule essentially authorizes “summary execution of anyone 
who flees from the police in a motor vehicle” and yet does nothing to 
reduce the number of innocent bystanders, police officers, and suspects 
who are killed in police pursuits each year.51 While the Court’s broad 
reasonableness standard might reduce the potential for danger in a 
vacuum, a realistic review of police pursuits indicates that complete 
deference to officers’ decisions to use deadly force will do little to reduce 
the prevalence of pursuits and could add unnecessary danger.52 
Justice Scalia’s approach established the per se rule53 that the use of 
ramming techniques—which could cause serious injury or death—is always 
reasonable to terminate a vehicle pursuit,54 rejecting the previously-
accepted application of Garner to deadly force cases.55 If the Court had 
applied Garner, Officer Scott’s actions may have been deemed 
unreasonable given that the Eleventh Circuit already determined that 
Harris’ conduct was not dangerous and rejected the argument that Harris’ 
attempt to flee necessitated excessive force.56 In fact, the Eleventh Circuit 
noted that “Harris remained in control of his vehicle, slowed for turns 
and intersections, and typically used his indicators for turns.”57 In 
reviewing the videotape, though, the Court overruled this factual finding 
and determined that when the suspect created the risk, use of force to 
end a police chase was presumptively reasonable regardless of the 
consequences.58 
Justice Stevens’ dissent highlights that a reasonable juror could have 
determined that Harris did not create a dangerous condition that justified 
the use of deadly force. After viewing the videotape, for example, Justice 
 
 50. Harmon, supra note 43, at 1160 n.187. 
 51. Blum, supra note 35, at 55. 
 52. Alpert & Smith, supra note 39, at 4; Jerome H. Skolnick & James J. Fyfe, Above the Law: 
Police and the Excessive Use of Force 11 (1994) (noting that “fleeing motorists become prime 
candidates for painful lessons at the ends of police nightsticks”). 
 53. Scott, 550 U.S. at 389 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“I disagree with the Court insofar as it 
articulates a per se rule.”); Beshers v. Harrison, 495 F.3d 1260, 1272 (11th Cir. 2007) (Presnell, J., 
concurring) (“For all of its talk of a balancing test, the Harris court has, in effect, established a per se 
rule . . . .”). 
 54. Harmon, supra note 43, at 1139 n.98 (“The Court’s conclusion . . . likely represents something 
very close to a per se rule.”). 
 55. Id. at 1135. 
 56. Harris v. Coweta Cnty., Ga, 433 F.3d 807, 815–16 (11th Cir. 2005), rev’d sub nom. Scott, 550 
U.S. 372 (2007). 
 57. Id. 
 58. Scott, 550 U.S. at 380–81. 
M - Buchwalter_13 (N. Teixeira).doc (Do Not Delete) 8/17/2014 5:01 PM 
1674 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 65:1665 
Stevens himself concluded that the pursuit was not necessarily dangerous59 
and that abandonment of the chase may have best served public safety.60 
Even if a jury deemed Harris’ conduct dangerous, Justice Stevens 
emphasized that it was not “a capital offense, or even an offense that 
justified the use of deadly force rather than abandonment of the chase.”61 
Thus, in finding Scott’s use of excessive force reasonable, the Court’s 
rule “fl[ies] in the face of the flexible and case-by-case ‘reasonableness’ 
approach applied in Garner and Graham.”62 Scott makes it more difficult 
for suspect-plaintiffs in § 1983 cases to survive summary judgment, but 
the broad reasonableness standard now threatens to prevent plaintiffs 
from recovery at all stages of litigation, as courts have recently used Scott 
to decline to read “deadly force” jury instructions at trial.63 
Scott’s presumption has become even more entrenched with the 
Supreme Court’s 2014 Plumhoff decision, which concerned another 
§ 1983 high-speed pursuit case.64 Plumhoff involved an excessive force 
case brought by the family of Donald Rickard, who was killed—along 
with a passenger—when police officers fired fifteen shots into his vehicle 
after a prolonged police pursuit.65 As in Scott, the Justices watched a 
video of the pursuit at oral argument and determined that the officer’s 
conduct was reasonable.66 At oral arguments, the Court spent much of its 
time lecturing the plaintiff’s attorney that, in order to prevail, he would 
need to show that it is “clearly established . . . that police cannot shoot to 
kill when a car is moving.”67 The Court ultimately concluded—after mere 
references to Garner and Graham—that “it is beyond serious dispute 
that Rickard’s flight posed a grave public safety risk, and here, as in 
Scott, the police acted reasonably in using deadly force to end that 
risk.”68 
 
 59. Id. at 392 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“At no point during the chase did respondent pull into the 
opposite lane other than to pass a car in front of him . . . and, on most of those occasions, used his turn 
signal . . . . [T]he video does not reveal any incidents that could even be remotely characterized as 
‘close calls.’”). 
 60. Id. at 393 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“What would have happened if the police had decided to 
abandon the chase? We now know that they could have apprehended respondent later because they 
had his license plate number.”). 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 396. 
 63. See, e.g., Terranova v. New York, 676 F.3d 305, 307, 309 (2d Cir. 2012) (holding that it was 
reasonable for the lower court to remove “deadly force” jury instructions because under Scott, “it was 
inappropriate to instruct the jury on the Garner factors in cases with dissimilar facts”). 
 64. Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012, 2017–23 (2014). 
 65. Id. 
 66. Lyle Denniston, Argument Analysis: To Decide, or Not, SCOTUSBlog (Mar. 4, 2014, 
1:14 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/03/argument-analysis-to-decide-or-not. 
 67. Id. (quoting Chief Justice Roberts).  
 68. Plumhoff, 134 S. Ct. at 2022.  
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This Note argues that the Court has misapplied the “clearly 
established” standard in order to create a bright line rule that has proven 
to be problematic in practice. The question should not be whether officer 
conduct violated clearly established law in a vacuum, but rather whether 
the conduct violated clearly established law based on the facts of the 
particular case. Even if firing shots at a moving vehicle does not necessarily 
violate clearly established law, for example, firing fifteen shots to end a 
police pursuit might violate clearly established law if the conduct put 
innocent bystanders at risk or if the officer could have used less lethal 
means to apprehend the suspect. To make this fact-specific determination, 
courts should consider not only whether the officer’s conduct violated 
clearly established Supreme Court rulings, but also whether the conduct 
expressly violated state and local policies regulating excessive force. 
B. The Supreme Court Expanded Its Authority by Rejecting 
Factual Findings of Lower Courts 
Scott also stands for the rule that when video of a police pursuit 
exists, the Court can review this video itself rather than rely on the 
district court’s factual findings.69 Typically, the Court must defer to the 
district courts for questions of fact, though it can review these findings 
for clear error.70 In reviewing issues of fact, the Court should “give due 
weight to inferences drawn from those facts by resident judges and local 
law enforcement officers.”71 Additionally, even though he did not do so in 
Scott, Justice Scalia acknowledged that in a summary judgment motion, 
“facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving 
party.”72 Both the district court and the Eleventh Circuit determined that 
Harris’ conduct did not, by itself, create a public danger that justified the 
use of deadly force.73 Thus, if the Court deferred to local judges and 
weighed the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, 
Scott would be an open-and-shut denial of summary judgment.  
In reviewing the video, however, the Court took the then-unusual 
step of relying on its own senses to make factual determinations to justify 
a legal rule, echoing Justice Stewart’s famous line “I know [obscenity] 
 
 69. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007) (“The videotape quite clearly contradicts the version 
of the story told by respondent and adopted by the Court of Appeals.”). 
 70. Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 242 (2001). 
 71. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996). 
 72. Scott, 550 U.S. at 380; Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). 
 73. Harris v. Coweta Cnty., Ga., 433 F.3d 807, 815–16 (11th Cir. 2005), rev’d sub nom. Scott, 550 
U.S. 372 (2007) (“As noted by the district court judge, taking the facts from the non-movant’s 
viewpoint, Harris remained in control of his vehicle, slowed for turns and intersections, and typically 
used his indicators for turns.”). 
M - Buchwalter_13 (N. Teixeira).doc (Do Not Delete) 8/17/2014 5:01 PM 
1676 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 65:1665 
when I see it.”74 If the Court had relied on the conclusions of local judges 
and weighed the evidence in the light most favorable to Harris, the result 
likely would have been different. Indeed, Justices Breyer and Ginsburg 
each acknowledged that watching the video footage of the car chase 
affected their determination of the case.75 
After reviewing the videotape, the Court erred in holding that “no 
reasonable jury” could find that Harris’ driving was not per se dangerous. 
In fact, one Supreme Court Justice, three Appellate Court Judges, and 
the District Court Judge who presided over the case each found that 
Harris’ conduct was not inherently dangerous and did not justify the use of 
deadly force.76 Moreover, studies indicate that different communities—
which could form the jury pool for a case like Scott—have different 
conceptions of what constitutes dangerous driving and when police force is 
reasonable.77 After watching the video, for example, most respondents to 
one study reported that they considered Harris’ driving to be dangerous, 
but African Americans and low-income workers “tended to perceive less 
danger in Harris’ flight, to attribute more responsibility to the police for 
creating the risk for the public, and to find less justification in the use of 
deadly force to end the chase.”78 
The Court’s review of the video therefore raises two central concerns. 
First, it forces the Court to attempt to determine what a reasonable jury 
could decide based not on what an actual jury could decide, but based on 
the values of the nine Justices.79 By neglecting the views of certain sub-
communities that might be sympathetic to the suspect and critical of the 
officer, the Court essentially endorsed the potential for denying a victim 
the right to a jury of her peers.80 Second, reviewing the video creates the 
potential for an inequitable application of justice; the presence or absence 
of a video should not contribute to the determination of a defendant’s guilt 
 
 74. Dan M. Kahan et al., Whose Eyes are you Going to Believe? Scott v. Harris and the Perils of 
Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 Harv. L. Rev. 837, 903 n.211 (2009) (quoting Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 
184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring)). 
 75. Scott, 550 U.S. at 387 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“[W]atching the video footage of the car chase made 
a difference to my own view of the case.”); id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (“The video footage of the car 
chase . . . demonstrates that the officer’s conduct did not transgress Fourth Amendment limitations.”). 
 76. Id. at 392 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Harris, 433 F.3d at 815–16. 
 77. Kahan et al., supra note 74, at 864–65. 
 78. Id. at 841. 
 79. See id. at 853 (“The facts highlighted by Justice Scalia’s analysis . . . all relate to moral (and 
legal) attributions of blame. Perceptions of those facts . . . are likely to be motivated by extrinsic moral 
evaluations of the putatively blameworthy actors—Harris and the police.”). 
 80. See U.S. Const. amend. VI. This system also undermines the legitimacy of the jury system—in 
both criminal and civil courts—because it prevents jurors from certain backgrounds from the exercising 
an opportunity to serve on a jury. Kahan et al., supra note 74, at 887 (“[O]rdering that the case be decided 
summarily based on the video was wrong precisely because doing so denied a dissenting group of citizens 
the respect they were owed, and hence denied the law the legitimacy it needs, when the law adopts a view 
of the facts that divides citizens on social, cultural, and political lines.”). 
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or innocence. Under Scott, an appellate court could find a defendant 
guilty based on watching the video,81 but find the defendant not guilty in 
the absence of a video by relying on the lower court’s factual findings. 
In Morton v. Kirkwood, for example, the Eleventh Circuit interpreted 
Scott to hold that “where an accurate video recording completely and 
clearly contradicts a party’s testimony, that testimony becomes 
incredible.”82 The court held further that Kirkwood, an officer who shot 
the suspect-plaintiff Morton seven times after a vehicle pursuit, fell short 
of this standard because rather than a video recording, he merely offered 
“forensic evidence that [did] not so utterly discredit Morton’s testimony 
that no reasonable jury could believe it.”83 Taken to its logical extreme, 
this holding indicates that it could become even more difficult for a 
suspect-plaintiff to succeed on a § 1983 claim if the police officer produces 
video that undermines any aspect of the victim’s testimony. 
II.  SCOTT’s Reasonableness Analysis Ignored Important Factors 
The Supreme Court can depart from its own precedent (here, 
Garner and Graham) and create new rules with impunity.84 But with 
Scott, the Court did not simply modify its excessive force analysis; it 
completely rewrote the book on use of deadly force as applied to vehicle 
pursuits. Even if, as Justice Scalia posits,85 Scott simply marks a change in 
how the reasonableness test is applied, it ignores three central elements 
that courts should consider when analyzing use of force applied to police 
pursuits. First, the police pursuit added danger to the public. Second, the 
Court did not consider police tools that indicate strongly that the officers 
could have apprehended Harris safely if they had abandoned the chase. 
Third, subsequent decisions indicate that Scott is unworkable and has led 
to problematic holdings in the lower courts. The absence of these 
considerations underscores Scott’s flawed reasoning. 
A. The Pursuit Added Danger to the Public 
Scott erred in neglecting the severity of Harris’ underlying offense 
or the public safety risk added by pursuing—rather than abandoning—
the chase. Scott’s holding contravenes the purpose of most police 
 
 81. Or, as the case may be, selecting only the video that would be the most helpful to the 
prosecution’s case. In Scott, the Court’s opinion does not mention three other videotapes entered into the 
record, which may have corroborated Harris’s version of the facts. Alpert & Smith, supra note 39, at 11. 
 82. Morton v. Kirkwood, 707 F.3d 1276, 1284 (11th Cir. 2013). 
 83. Id. 
 84. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577 (2003) (“The doctrine of stare decisis is essential to the 
respect accorded to the judgments of the Court and to the stability of the law. It is not, however, an 
inexorable command.”). 
 85. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 382 (2007) (“Garner was simply an application of the Fourth 
Amendment’s ‘reasonableness’ test.”). 
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department policies regarding high-speed pursuits.86 Indeed, according to 
a survey of pursuit policies nationwide, the average policy “mandates 
that an officer may initiate a high-speed pursuit only after the officer 
concludes that the risk to the public by not apprehending the suspect 
outweighs the dangers such a pursuit presents.”87 
Georgia itself, where the pursuit at issue in Scott took place, 
requires that an officer terminate a pursuit when “the immediate danger 
to the public created by the pursuit is greater than the immediate or 
potential danger to the public should the suspect remain at large.”88 
Georgia police departments also mandate that officers abandon a pursuit 
“when the violator’s identity has been established to the point that later 
apprehension can be accomplished without danger to the public.”89 
Under Georgia’s guidelines, Scott’s conduct was unreasonable because 
Harris posed no danger to the public before the pursuit, did not add 
significant risk during the pursuit, and police could have apprehended 
him safely after the pursuit by tracking his license plate number (among 
other tactics). Courts should consider these state and local guidelines in 
their interpretation of whether an officer’s conduct was reasonable or 
violated clearly established law. 
Moreover, most policies forbid pursuits when the underlying offence 
is a nonviolent misdemeanor or a traffic violation.90 In Scott, the officers 
originally recorded Harris driving seventy-three miles per hour in a fifty-
five miles per hour zone, and Harris had no warrants out for his arrest.91 
Because most police departments would not condone the type of 
protracted pursuit displayed in Scott, the officer’s conduct could not have 
been presumptively reasonable and would have been contrary to clearly 
established law in light of these policies.92 
This conclusion is supported by the fact that the pursuit likely 
increased the risk of public danger.93 A 1997 analysis of police pursuit 
policies nationwide acknowledged that “increasing the number of vehicles 
involved in police pursuits increased the likelihood of apprehension, but 
 
 86. See Brief for the National Police Accountability Project as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Respondents at *5, Scott, 550 U.S. 372 (No. 05–1631), 2007 WL 128585 [hereinafter Brief for the 
National Police Accountability Project]. 
 87. Id. at *6. 
 88. Brief for the Georgia Association of Chiefs of Police, Inc. as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Neither Party at *33, Scott, 550 U.S. 372 (No. 05–1631), 2006 WL 3693417. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Brief for the National Police Accountability Project, supra note 86, at *6. 
 91. Scott, 550 U.S. at 390; Kahan et al., supra note 74, at 844. 
 92. See Brief for the National Police Accountability Project, supra note 86, at *6; Tennessee v. 
Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 10–11 (1985) (“The fact is that a majority of police departments in this country 
have forbidden the use of deadly force against nonviolent suspects.”). 
 93. Kahan et al., supra note 74, at 894 (“When police decide to initiate a high-speed chase—and 
to persist in it until they manage to force the suspect to lose control of his vehicle and crash—they 
create immense risk for members of the public generally.”). 
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also the chance of accidents, injuries, and property damage.”94 Statistics 
indicate that an alarming number of civilians and innocent bystanders are 
killed as a result of police pursuits.95 Of the 424 people killed in police 
pursuits in 2007 alone, for example, 119 (twenty-eight percent) were 
innocent civilians, compared to nine (two percent) who were police 
officers, and 296 (seventy percent) who were occupants of the chased 
vehicle.96 If the officers had temporarily abandoned the pursuit and 
apprehended Harris later, they would not have created an added danger 
to the public or risked contributing to this troubling statistic. 
There is no dispute that pursuit policies must give some deference to 
officers who “are often forced to make split-second judgments—in 
circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the 
amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation.”97 But allowing 
too much deference can cause unnecessary risk to suspects and innocent 
bystanders because these tense situations often involve an officer who 
has been in “an adrenaline-driven chase, and who is highly excited or 
extremely angry at the suspect.”98 Thus, by virtue of having challenged 
police authority by attempting to flee, “fleeing motorists become prime 
candidates for painful lessons at the ends of police nightsticks,”99 or, as 
the case may be, police vehicles.  
Retributive force, a potential byproduct of these adrenaline-laden 
pursuits, raises additional Fourth Amendment concerns.100 Although it is 
important to give some deference to officers in the line of duty, involved 
parties often disagree about what constitutes excessive force.101 Thus, 
whatever deference is given to officers should be accompanied by policies 
that protect the public and state clearly what conduct is considered 
reasonable. If courts considered state and local policies to guide their 
reasonableness determinations, then officers would be more likely to 
abide by these regulations and err on the side of caution because of their 
knowledge that the use of force could trigger tort liability. 
 
 94. Geoffrey P. Alpert et al., Police Pursuit: Policies and Training, National Institute of Justice, 
May 1997, at 2, available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/164831.pdf. 
 95. Crashes Involving Police in Pursuit, supra note 6, at 51–52. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989). 
 98. Geoffrey P. Alpert et al., Police Pursuits and the Use of Force: Recognizing and Managing 
“The Pucker Factor”—A Research Note, 14 Just. Q. 371, 383 (1997). 
 99. Skolnick & Fyfe, supra note 52, at 11. 
 100. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 223 (1973) (noting in a search consent case that use 
of police brutality to obtain a confession is unconstitutional). 
 101. Alpert et al., supra note 98, at 381. In one report, suspects reported the use of force in fifty-
seven percent of criminal apprehensions, while in another report, only forty-seven percent of officer 
supervisors reported the use of force. Id. Force was officially reported in only seventeen percent of 
these apprehensions. Id. 
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B. Harris Could Have Been Apprehended if the Chase Had Been 
Abandoned 
In today’s world, evading police officers who have information about 
the suspect’s car, license plate number, location, and potential destinations 
would require criminal sophistication on par with Hollywood heist films.102 
To apprehend suspects safely without a high-speed chase, police officers 
employ traditional tactics—including license plate tracking and helicopter 
detection103—or newly available technological methods104 to prevent 
danger and catch the suspect without unnecessarily endangering the 
public. 
Another of Scott’s central weaknesses is that it has a short half-life 
because what society considers reasonable must depend partially on the 
resources available to police officers. Police technology has advanced 
dramatically since the days of Dragnet105 and Magnum, P.I.,106 and the 
Court should not identify a per se rule for police pursuits given that 
reasonableness factors are ever-changing in the face of new technology. 
Instead of taking this into account, the Court ignored technological 
advances and found that Scott’s conduct was reasonable due partially to 
the necessity of preventing Harris from escaping.107 In reality, newly 
available technology likely could have enabled the police to apprehend 
Scott later. 
Paul D. Shultz, the Chief of Police for Lafayette, Colorado, has stated 
that new technological methods, including GPS systems, “are reducing the 
need for police pursuits. This technology enables officers to apprehend a 
dangerous suspect at a later date when the safety of the community can be 
maximized.”108 In addition to GPS technology, Chief Shultz lauded 
automatic license plate recognition technology, which permits license 
plate numbers to be automatically synthesized using optical character 
recognition to glean additional information about the suspect—including 
name and address—so that the officers can temporarily suspend the 
search and make a safe arrest later.109 Furthermore, high-tech radios 
enable officers to share photographs and video footage of the suspect 
 
 102. See, e.g., Ocean’s Eleven (Warner Bros. 2001). 
 103. See Ed Grabianowski, How Police Chases Work, How Stuff Works, 
http://people.howstuffworks.com/police-chase.htm (last visited Aug. 1, 2014) (explaining traditional 
methods used to end police pursuits). 
 104. See Paul D. Shultz, The Future is Here: Technology in Police Departments, Police Chief 
Magazine, June 2008, available at http://www.policechiefmagazine.org/magazine/ 
index.cfm?article_id=1527&fuseaction=display&issue_id=62008 (describing modern technologies that 
could help to reduce the danger of police pursuits); see also infra notes 112–14 and accompanying text. 
 105. Dragnet (NBC television broadcast 1951–59). 
 106. Magnum, P.I. (CBS television broadcast 1980–88). 
 107. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 370, 385 (2007). 
 108. Shultz, supra note 104 (emphasis added). 
 109. Id. 
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and share license plate numbers “across thousands of miles in minutes or 
even seconds.”110 These modern tools to ameliorate the dangers of police 
pursuits are supported by the establishment of an international database 
with information and statistics about pursuit suspects.111 
Police technology is sure to develop even further in the coming 
years. Such technology will increase the likelihood of safe apprehension 
in lieu of dangerous police chases. GPS bullets, for example, “allow 
officers to shoot tracking devices onto other vehicles to be monitored 
remotely and are already reportedly in use in four states” at little to no 
danger to the suspect.112 The California Peace Officer’s Association has 
expressed interest in High Speed Avoidance Laser Technology, which 
would allow officers to reduce the speed of a fleeing suspect’s car by 
firing a laser at the engine.113 Additionally, one company developed a 
microwave gun that would enable police officers to overload the fleeing 
suspect’s car’s electrical system and stop the engine.114 
Current technologies, in addition to these promising experimental 
technologies, indicate that suspension of police pursuits in favor of safe 
apprehension of suspects without added public danger will only become 
more viable in the coming years.115 As such use grows more common, Jay 
Stanley of the American Civil Liberties Union predicts that individuals 
“being chased by the police [will] realize that they have no hope of 
escape unless they somehow get that device off of their car.”116 Use of 
such technology would reduce the necessity for high-speed pursuits, 
meaning that—absent Scott—officers would need to satisfy a high bar to 
properly use force. 
 
 110. Id. 
 111. See Lum & Fachner, supra note 7, at 1 (“The goal of this project was to create an internet-
based, interactive computerized reporting system by which police agencies could submit and manage 
reports of vehicular pursuits and in turn, access the full database for statistical reports compiled from 
all pursuits recorded in the database.”). Programs like COMPSTAT already perform a similar 
function on a more local level by helping “precincts and boroughs share knowledge with each other.” 
Id. at 12. 
 112. Joshua Rhett Miller, The Cop of the Future: Will Crooks Have a Chance Against Smart 
Bullets, Crowd-Stun Cannons and Eyes Everywhere?, FoxNews.com (Jan. 27, 2014), 
http://www.foxnews.com/us/2014/01/27/cop-future-will-crooks-have-chance-against-smart-bullets-
crowd-stun-cannons-and. 
 113. Jessica Garrison, High-Tech HALT to Chases, L.A. Times, (May 29, 2000), 
http://articles.latimes.com/2000/may/29/local/me-35280. 
 114. Grabianowski, supra note 103. 
 115. Civil liberties advocates have lauded such technologies as “less lethal” than traditional 
methods of detection, and note that if used properly, they will not open a Pandora’s box of new 
privacy concerns. See Miller, supra note 112. 
 116. Id. 
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C.  SCOTT Set a Dangerous Precedent for Lower Courts 
The potential for the police to apprehend a suspect safely in the 
absence of force points toward a single conclusion that weighs strongly in 
favor of abandoning Scott: it created a dangerous precedent, which, 
when applied to other circumstances, increases the danger of pursuits to 
the public. Since Scott, district and appellate courts have grappled with 
the presumptive reasonableness standard for use of excessive force and 
have even extended the broad reasonableness standard to more 
dangerous situations.117 
Scott’s strain on lower courts is best illustrated by the Eleventh 
Circuit’s Beshers v. Harrison decision.118 The facts of Beshers are 
remarkably similar to the facts of Scott. Beshers’ son filed a § 1983 claim 
after a police officer used deadly force to end a high-speed police pursuit, 
killing Beshers.119 Despite his finding that the suspect’s conduct was not 
“particularly heinous,” and certainly did not warrant death, Judge 
Presnell’s concurrence stated that Scott compelled him “to conclude that, 
as a matter of law, [Officer] Harrison had the right to end the chase by 
killing Beshers.”120 Judge Presnell explained that his decision and Scott’s 
precedent troubled him because it ignores the danger to the suspect. 
“For all of its talk of a balancing test, the [Scott] court has, in effect, 
established a per se rule: Unless the chase occurs below the speed limit 
on a deserted highway, the use of deadly force to end a motor vehicle 
pursuit is always a reasonable seizure.”121 In other words, Judge Presnell 
lamented Scott’s implication that officers could kill a suspect to end 
nearly any police pursuit. 
Since Beshers, lower courts have found that use of force was not 
reasonable only when the facts were markedly distinct from Scott, like 
when officers terminated a pursuit by shooting the suspect multiple 
times.122 But the Plumhoff decision, which applied Scott’s reasonableness 
presumption even where the suspect and his passenger were killed after 
 
 117. See, e.g., Abney v. Coe, 493 F.3d 412, 413 (4th Cir. 2007) (finding that an officer’s use of 
deadly force on suspect on a motorcycle was objectively reasonable). 
 118. 495 F.3d 1260 (11th Cir. 2007). 
 119. Id. at 1263; 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2011). 
 120. Beshers, 495 F.3d at 1271–72 (Presnell, J., concurring). 
 121. Id. 
 122. See, e.g., Zion v. Nassan, No. 12–3193, 2014 WL 323373, at *5 (3d Cir. Jan. 30, 2014) (“[I]t 
may be reasonable for an officer to bump a car off the road to stop a reckless driver who is placing 
others in peril, while simultaneously unreasonable to shoot directly at a driver who is coming toward 
an officer when the officer has the opportunity to move out of the way.”); Lyte v. Bexar Cnty., Tex., 
560 F.3d 404, 408, 417 (5th Cir. 2009) (finding that the officer’s conduct was not reasonable when he 
fired his weapon through the suspect’s rear window, killing a passenger). This is not always the case; 
the Tenth Circuit held, for example, that an officer’s use of deadly force—shooting the suspect in the 
back of the head to end the pursuit—was reasonable. Cordova v. Aragon, 569 F.3d 1183, 1189–90 
(10th Cir. 2010). 
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officers fired fifteen shots into the car, indicates that even use of deadly 
force by gunfire is now considered reasonable.123  
Most cases involving the use of force to terminate a simple vehicle 
pursuit have resolved in favor of the officer, which supports the contention 
that these cases are no longer reviewed based on the jury’s determination 
of the facts, but based on Scott’s presumption favoring summary 
judgment.124 This was one of the results that Judge Presnell criticized in 
Beshers: under the balancing test, “a jury ought to be deciding whether 
the risk posed by the fleeing suspect is too minimal, or the suspected 
crime too minor, to make killing him a reasonable way to halt the chase,” 
but due to Scott’s precedent, “that decision has been taken away from 
the jury where, as here, the fleeing suspect has endangered others.”125 A 
more suitable test would apply the Court’s deadly force analysis not 
based on the type of weapon used—police firearm or police car—but on 
the likelihood that the use of force would kill or seriously injure the 
pursued suspect, the risk of harm to the public, and whether local policies 
condone the use of force in the given situation. 
The Fifth Circuit’s decision in Pasco v. Knoblauch126 highlights the 
powerful impact of the presumptive reasonableness standard because the 
Court decided Scott after the district court denied Officer Knoblauch’s 
motion for summary judgment. Pasco involved a police chase in which the 
suspect was killed as a result of injuries incurred after police used a 
ramming technique to terminate a pursuit.127 The suspect had been driving 
over ninety miles per hour in a rural area to evade police detection.128 The 
officer conceded that the chase did not directly threaten pedestrians or 
motorists and that Pasco slowed down toward the end of the pursuit, but 
argued that the ramming technique used to run the suspect’s car off the 
road was still reasonable.129 Before Scott, the district court relied on 
Garner to hold that the officer “violated clear Fourth Amendment law 
because [he] ‘was acting contrary to police department protocol’ when he 
bumped Pasco off the road.”130 The Fifth Circuit reversed, citing the 
newly decided Scott decision to hold that the officer’s ramming 
technique was permissible because “it was reasonable for the officer to 
choose to end the chase in light of the relative culpability of those at 
risk.”131 Pasco underscores the sea change in excessive force litigation 
 
 123. Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012, 2022–23(2014). 
 124. See supra Part I.A; see also Beshers, 495 F.3d at 1263; Pasco v. Knoblauch, 566 F.3d 572, 580–
81 (5th Cir. 2009). 
 125. Beshers, 495 F.3d at 1272 (Presnell, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
 126. 566 F.3d 572 (5th Cir. 2009). 
 127. Id. at 574. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. at 579. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. at 581. 
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and indicates that some officers may interpret Scott to permit the use of 
force even when it violates the officer’s own department protocol and 
will not reduce the risk of danger to the public. 
Scott’s broad application does not end there. Some circuits have 
approved of the use of force when the suspect’s significant injury or death 
is even more assured. In Abney v. Coe, for example, the Fourth Circuit 
expanded Scott’s reach to apply to excessive force used against suspects on 
motorcycles.132 This is particularly troubling given that motorcycles 
provide very little protection; a police officer’s ramming technique nearly 
guarantees the suspect’s death. The court wrote, however, that “the fact 
that Abney was driving a motorcycle, rather than a car, does not require 
a different result since the probability that a motorist will be harmed by a 
Precision Intervention Technique is high in either circumstance.”133 The 
Fourth Circuit held that the officer’s conduct was reasonable under the 
Fourth Amendment based on Scott’s presumptive reasonableness 
standard, even though Scott did not contemplate use of deadly force for 
suspects who were fleeing on motorcycles. 
Thus, in addition to applying too broadly in deadly force cases 
involving vehicles, Scott’s extension to motorcycles creates confusion 
regarding how the presumptive reasonableness standard should be 
applied in analogous circumstances that could create an even greater risk 
of death or serious injury to the suspect.134 For this reason, a case-by-case 
standard for police pursuit excessive force claims is preferable, and courts 
should defer to local policies and guidelines—taking into account the 
unique characteristics of the city or state—to determine reasonableness. 
III.  Public Policy Favors Circumventing SCOTT 
Given the problems inherent in Scott, a suitable solution would 
consider the potential danger that the police pursuit adds to the public, 
the ability for the officers to safely catch and apprehend the suspect later, 
and the workability of a new rule. To accomplish this, the Court would 
need to overrule Scott’s presumptive reasonableness standard and re-
establish the case-by-case reasonableness analysis that the Court 
approved in Garner and Graham.135 But overruling an eight-to-one 
 
 132. See Abney v. Coe, 493 F.3d 412, 413 (4th Cir. 2007) (finding that an officer’s use of deadly 
force on suspect on motorcycle was objectively reasonable). 
 133. Id. at 418. Some courts have distinguished Scott in § 1983 claims involving motorcycles. See 
Walker v. Davis, 649 F.3d 502, 503 (6th Cir. 2011) (finding the officer’s conduct unreasonable because 
the suspect’s motorcycle did not pose an immediate threat to anyone). 
 134. Though not the focus of this Note, Scott’s disdain for suspects who flee from police officers 
has led to restrictions for criminal defendants outside of the § 1983 context. See Terranova v. New 
York, 676 F.3d 305, 307 (2d Cir. 2012) (holding that it was reasonable for the lower court to remove 
“deadly force” jury instructions because under Scott, “it was inappropriate to instruct the jury on the 
Garner factors in cases with dissimilar facts”). 
 135. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8 (1985); Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989). 
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precedent—even one as flawed as Scott—is not likely, as became clear in 
Plumhoff.136 As a result, the onus falls on state and local governments to 
craft guidelines to clarify when the use of force is considered reasonable. 
Even if courts do not take state and local guidelines under consideration, 
establishing clear policies and training procedures could still reduce the 
prevalence of dangerous police pursuits.137 
Any solution to this problem must also address Justice Scalia’s 
concern regarding the risk of creating the perverse incentive for suspects 
to evade police officers.138 Of course, any new rule would not be 
workable if it was interpreted as condoning or promoting evasion of 
police officers. But this would not result from the rules proposed by this 
Note. In fact, by strengthening police tactics to apprehend the suspect 
after pursuit, suspects will know that any attempt to evade police 
detection would be futile result in a more significant punishment when 
the suspect was inevitably apprehended. 
Local governments must take it upon themselves to determine the 
circumstances in which it would be reasonable to terminate any pursuit, 
especially considering that “reasonableness is judged against the backdrop 
of the law at the time of the conduct.”139 If the pursuit is triggered by a 
nonviolent infraction and the police conduct would add danger to the 
public, for example, the officer’s use of potentially deadly force would be 
unreasonable. If a violent crime involving significant risk to others 
triggered the pursuit, on the other hand, then an officer’s conduct 
terminating the pursuit would still be presumptively reasonable. Given 
that the danger to the public will differ based on the specific jurisdiction, 
local governments could establish different rules depending on their size, 
 
 136. See Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012, 2023–24 (2014) (holding in a nine-to-zero decision 
that use of force to terminate a police pursuit is presumptively reasonable). 
 137. To be clear, federal courts are under no obligation to consider local preferences when 
drawing their reasonableness determinations. Federal courts must defer, however, to state courts on 
questions of substantive law. Erie R.R. Co. v. Thompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). Courts frequently 
defer to state preferences on issues that could be applied differently depending on local values. See, 
e.g., Johnson v. Williams, 133 S. Ct. 1088, 1094 (2013) (ruling that federal courts should defer to state 
determinations in habeas proceedings). Indeed, Justice Brandeis famously hailed the status of states as 
laboratories of democracy. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 387 (1932) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting). This Note argues that even in the absence of a federal obligation, taking such local 
preferences into account would mark a meaningful improvement in the Court’s excessive force 
jurisprudence because it is a common sense way to determine how a reasonable police officer in those 
circumstances would act. 
 138. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 385 (2007) (“[W]e are loath to lay down a rule requiring the 
police to allow fleeing suspects to get away whenever they drive so recklessly that they put other 
people’s lives in danger. It is obvious the perverse incentives such a rule would create . . . .”). 
 139. Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198 (2004). It is important to note, however, that local 
government standards may not impact the Court’s reasonableness analysis. The Court has determined, 
for example, that “qualified immunity shields an officer from suit when she makes a decision that, 
even if constitutionally deficient, reasonably misapprehends the law governing the circumstances she 
confronted.” Id. 
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resources, and level of congestion. This Part analyzes two potential rules: 
one for urban areas, using the San Francisco Police Department (“SFPD”) 
as an example, and the other for highways, using the California Highway 
Patrol (“CHP”) as an example. 
A. Urban Areas: San Francisco Example 
Due to congestion and the presence of pedestrians and other 
innocent bystanders, urban areas raise unique questions regarding the 
utility of high-speed police pursuits. The SFPD’s pursuit policy should 
guide other cities because its primary goal is the safety of city residents, it 
forbids ramming as a technique to terminate a pursuit, and it urges that a 
pursuit should be abandoned if it would add danger to the public.140 But 
the SFPD’s pursuit policy was last revised in 1997—a decade before the 
Court overhauled deadly force standards related to pursuits. Thus, given 
the post-Scott potential for confusion regarding which techniques are 
reasonable for officers to use in police chases, the SFPD (and other 
cities) should revise its policy to specify exactly when an officer’s conduct 
would be considered unreasonable. 
The SFPD encourages officers to take “reasonable efforts to 
apprehend fleeing violators,” but states that “if an emergency response or 
pursuit would pose an unreasonable risk to persons or property, the 
pursuit or emergency shall not be initiated.”141 Moreover, when “it 
becomes apparent that the benefits of immediate apprehension are clearly 
outweighed by an unreasonable danger to the officer or others, the pursuit 
shall not be initiated or, if already in progress, shall be terminated.”142 The 
policy encourages officers to consider a number of factors to determine 
whether to pursue the fleeing suspect, including the seriousness of the 
triggering crime, public safety, speed, volume of pedestrian and vehicular 
traffic, and weather conditions.143 
The SFPD policy primarily condones “following actions,” such as 
boxing in, heading off, driving alongside, and channeling.144 Offensive 
tactics are rarely used, and the policy specifies that officers “shall not 
attempt to stop a vehicle by ramming it or forcing the vehicle off the 
road.”145 Other offensive tactics, like roadblocks and “road spikes,” are 
only approved in dire circumstances with heavy supervision.146 
 
 140. S.F. Police Dep’t, General Order 5.05: Response and Pursuit Driving IV.M.1 (Feb. 12, 1997). 
 141. Id. at I.B, I.C. 
 142. Id. at IV.B(2). 
 143. Id. at IV.B(3). 
 144. Id. at IV.M(1). 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. at IV.M(2)–(3). 
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The SFPD policy suggests that any ramming technique—like the 
one employed by Officer Scott—would be unreasonable.147 It also 
implies that an officer’s use of force would be unreasonable if the suspect 
could have been safely apprehended later, if the triggering offense was a 
minor violation, or if the pursuit created an added danger to the 
public.148 But given Scott’s broad reasonableness standard, a lower court 
would likely defer to the Supreme Court and condone an officer’s 
conduct even in the absence of the factors set out in the SFPD policy.149 
Thus, courts should consider state and local policies that state clearly what 
officer conduct is reasonable, especially given the unique dangers created 
by police pursuits in urban areas and the documented variety of public 
opinion regarding dangerous driving and reasonable police force.150 
Like the SFPD policy, urban policies should prohibit ramming 
techniques or only condone running the suspect’s vehicle off the road to 
terminate pursuits initiated by a violent triggering crime. At the most 
permissive end of the spectrum, urban pursuit policies should only 
permit ramming when there are no other cars or innocent bystanders in 
sight. Thus, an officer’s use of force following a police pursuit would be 
unreasonable if the triggering crime was nonviolent or minor, or if the 
maneuver occurred in a congested area such that it added to the public 
danger. 
This Note does not suggest a policy that could help dangerous 
criminals escape police detection. Consider a 2013 San Francisco police 
pursuit that occurred after the suspect fired his gun from his vehicle early 
in the morning.151 Although the pursuit ended in a crash that killed two 
innocent bystanders,152 this pursuit would be considered reasonable 
because the armed suspect continued to pose a significant risk to the 
public until he was apprehended. If, on the other hand, the pursuit and 
use of force were triggered by a nonviolent or minor violation, indicating 
that the suspect did not pose a grave danger to the public, then the 
officer’s conduct would have been unreasonable.153 An officer’s conduct 
 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 386 (2007). 
 150. See Kahan et al., supra note 74, at 841 (noting that African Americans and low-income 
individuals “tended to perceive less danger in Harris’ flight, to attribute more responsibility to the 
police for creating the risk for the public, and to find less justification in the use of deadly force to end 
the chase”). 
 151. Jill Tucker, Driver Flees from SF Traffic Stop; 2 Die, S.F. Chron. (Jan. 1, 2013), 
http://www.sfgate.com/crime/article/Driver-flees-from-SF-traffic-stop-2-die-4159713.php. 
 152. Id. 
 153. The example of the high-speed pursuit that officers initiated because the suspect had a knife, 
sending two innocent bystanders to the hospital, for example, should be considered unreasonable. 
Michaelson, supra note 1. 
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would also be considered unreasonable if she used unnecessarily risky 
tactics to end the pursuit.154 
B. Highways and Rural Areas: California Highway Patrol 
Example 
Outside of urban areas, police officers should have more leeway to 
pursue a suspect because it is less likely that such pursuits will add danger 
to the public, given that highways are typically free from pedestrians, 
include fewer obstacles, and often span rural areas. As in an urban 
pursuit, the local government’s pursuit policy should consider the 
officer’s use of force reasonable if the pursuit was triggered by a violent 
crime, the pursuit did not add danger to the public, and the suspect likely 
could not have been apprehended later. For highway patrols, though, 
these standards are likely to be applied differently than in an urban 
context. Due to the lack of pedestrians on highways, for example, it is less 
likely that the officer’s conduct will add danger to the public. Moreover, 
due to the potential for very high speeds on highways and their frequent 
connection to other states or even countries, it may be more difficult to 
apprehend the suspect later if the highway patrol officer temporarily 
suspends the chase. For this reason, an officer’s conduct would likely be 
deemed reasonable more frequently than in an urban context. 
California lawmakers have developed guidelines for when a CHP 
officer may pursue a suspect in a high-speed chase.155 California Senate 
Bill 719 requires police officers to undergo training for police pursuits, 
keep detailed records of such pursuits, and “develop uniform, minimum 
guidelines for adoption by [California] law enforcement agencies for 
response to high-speed vehicle pursuits.”156 The Peace Officers Research 
Association of California introduced Senate Bill 719—nicknamed 
“Kristie’s Law”—after Kristina Priano was killed when a fifteen year-old 
being chased by police officers collided with Kristie’s family’s minivan.157 
Reviewing the prior law, which granted broad immunity to police officers 
for deaths that resulted from high-speed police pursuits, a California 
Court of Appeal urged the legislature to “seriously reconsider the 
balance between public entity immunity and public safety. The balance 
appears to have shifted too far toward immunity and left public safety, as 
 
 154. One officer, for example, drove more than one hundred miles per hour into incoming traffic, and “leap-
frogged” other vehicles before killing an innocent motorist in a “fiery explosion.” Mark Maroney, DA: Cop 
‘Leap-Frogged’ Other Cars at 101 mph, The Express (Jan. 29, 2014), 
http://www.lockhaven.com/page/content.detail/id/549268/DA--Cop--leap-frogged--other-cars-at-101-mph.html. 
 155. Cal. S. B. 719, Ch. 485 (2005). 
 156. Id. at B(4). 
 157. Laura Smith, Prianos File Suit over Death of Daughter, Chico News & Review (Jun. 27, 
2002), http://www.newsreview.com/chico/prianos-file-suit-over-death-of-daughter/content?oid=9875. 
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well as compensation for innocent victims, twisting in the wind.”158 
Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger signed Kristie’s Law in 2005 and the 
Legislature later codified it as California Vehicle Code section 
17.004.7.159 
The Bill’s stated goal is to protect the public against injury or death 
by improving officer training and reducing the number of police 
pursuits.160 The adopted code provision is weaker than the proposed bill. 
Despite requiring certain minimum training standards for pursuits, for 
example, the law states that as long as such training is provided, the 
officer is “immune from liability for civil damages for personal injury to 
or death of any person” that the officer pursues.161 The law also clarifies 
that its provisions “represent minimum policy standards and do not limit 
an agency from adopting additional policy requirements,” but provides 
no clear guidance for when an officer’s conduct would be considered 
reasonable.162 Section 17004.7, as adopted, falls short in two important 
respects. First, in stating that “[p]ursuit intervention tactics include, but are 
not limited to, blocking, ramming, boxing, and roadblock procedures,”163 
the law lacks sufficient specificity to constitute a clear guideline. 
Additionally, in order to satisfy Fourth Amendment obligations when the 
intrusiveness of deadly force is “unmatched,”164 a suitable law should 
clearly state when the officer’s conduct would be considered unreasonable. 
Still, courts can infer when CHP believes an officer’s conduct is 
unreasonable based on the guidelines listed in section 17004.7. The code 
specifies that CHP officers should be trained to consider many elements, 
including when to initiate a pursuit, when to terminate a pursuit, and the 
hazards the pursuit creates to uninvolved pedestrians and motorists.165 
Any decision to initiate a pursuit, for example, should “address the 
importance of protecting the public and balancing the known or 
reasonably suspected offense, and the apparent need for immediate 
capture against the risks to peace officers, innocent motorists, and others 
to protect the public.”166 To determine whether to terminate the pursuit, 
the CHP officer must consider a variety of factors, including the risk to 
the public, the protection of the public “given the known or reasonably 
suspected offense and apparent need for immediate capture,” traffic 
safety and volume, and whether the suspect can be apprehended later.167 
 
 158. Nguyen v. City of Westminster, 127 Cal. Rptr. 2d 388, 394 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002). 
 159. Cal. Veh. Code § 17004.7 (2007). 
 160. S. Bill 719 at (L)(5)(g)–(i). 
 161. Veh. § 17004.7(b)(1). 
 162. Id. § 17004.7(e). 
 163. Id. § 17004.7(c)(6). 
 164. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 9 (2007). 
 165. See generally Veh. § 17004.7. 
 166. Id. § 17004.7(c)(1). 
 167. Id. § 17004.7(c)(9). 
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Despite the law’s drawbacks, courts should consider laws like 
section 17004.7 rather than rely on Scott’s presumptive reasonableness 
standard because such state and local policies represent what each 
jurisdiction considers reasonable based on local customs and 
characteristics. Scott and Plumhoff, however, essentially undermine code 
provisions like section 17004.7 by setting a broad reasonableness 
standard for officers who terminate police pursuits and by assuming that 
the officer’s termination of a police pursuit is reasonable regardless of 
the triggering violation, the danger to the public, or traffic conditions.168 
Thus, given that Supreme Court precedent governs § 1983 claims, if 
federal courts do not consider state and local guidelines when looking at 
reasonableness and clearly established law, then victims of death or 
serious injury will be precluded from bringing a civil claim even in the 
most flagrant examples of unreasonable officer conduct. 
Conclusion 
Clearer local statutes that set sharp boundaries for when use of 
deadly force is reasonable to terminate a police pursuit will not resolve 
all questions of excessive force. Indeed, in the past four decades, federal 
courts have consistently limited § 1983 claims and have granted qualified 
immunity much more broadly. But outside of the context of § 1983, 
courts are typically hesitant to set their own rules, and prefer to follow 
the stated preferences of local governments (provided that they are 
constitutional). The Court should consider such local guidelines rather 
than blindly apply the per se rule that use of force is reasonable even 
when it is likely to cause the suspect’s death. By following the guidelines 
for local police pursuit statutes set forth in this Note, cities and states 
nationwide can send the message that this “unmatched” invasion of 
Fourth Amendment rights is itself unreasonable and unsustainable. 
 
 
 168. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 386 (2007). 
